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Non-Technical Summary 
In 2005, the President of the Bank of Italy blocked the acquisition of Banca 
Antonveneta (BA) and Banca Nazionale de Lavoro (BNL) by the Dutch ABN 
Amro and the Spanish Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) for 
‘prudential reasons and formal errors’. This is possible because in the EU the 
control of bank M&A is subject to both competition and prudential control. 
Although the acquisition of BA by ABN Amro was finally approved, the 
intended take-over of the BNL by BBVA failed.  
Although there is anecdotal evidence that the prudential control may constitute a 
barrier to the integration of European retail banking markets, empirical evidence 
is, however, missing until now. The main problem is the lack of data on the 
scope for politicians and supervisors to block M&A in the banking sector. The 
main contribution of this paper is to collect this data and to construct indices on 
the political independence of bank supervisory authorities and the scope for 
supervisors to block the merger with or the acquisition of domestic credit 
institutions. The main source of information to construct these indices is a 
questionnaire on banking regulation that was sent to the supervisory authorities 
in the 25 EU member countries between October 2006 and March 2007. 
The descriptive analysis of our indices has shown that the degree of 
transparency and the strength of approval requirements for ownership transfers 
are different in the EU although the harmonization of banking regulations has 
already led to some level of convergence. Since the scope for supervisors and 
politicians to block cross-border M&A during merger control depends on the 
transparency of the supervisory review process and the strength of approval 
requirements, countries with transparent merger control and low approval 
requirements are expected to have lower market entry barriers than countries 
where M&A control is intransparent and approval requirements are high. Since 
the countries from Central and Eastern Europe are on average more transparent 
and have less approval requirements than the countries from Western Europe 
market entry barriers that arise from merger control are according to our indices 
smaller in the new EU member countries. If this has facilitated the entry of 
foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe and conversely dissuaded foreign 
credit-institutions from merging with or taking over banks from Western 
Europe, however, remains an empirical question. It shall be answered in a 
subsequent paper. 
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Abstract  
In 2005, the President of the Bank of Italy blocked the cross-border acquisition 
of two Italian banks for ‘prudential reasons and formal errors’. Following these 
events, the EU Commission brought actions against Italy for infringement of the 
principle of the free movement of capital. Although there is anecdotal evidence 
that prudential control may constitute a barrier to cross-border M&A in the 
banking sector, empirical evidence is missing until now. The main problem is 
the lack of data on the scope for politicians and supervisors to block M&A in the 
banking sector. The main contribution of this paper is to measure this scope for 
interference by constructing indices on the political independence and the 
transparency and strength of the supervisory review process of bank M&A. The 
main source of information to construct these indices is a questionnaire on 
banking regulation that was sent to the supervisory authorities in the 25 EU 
member countries between October 2006 and March 2007. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In 2005, the President of the Bank of Italy blocked the acquisition of Banca 
Antonveneta (BA) and Banca Nazionale de Lavoro (BNL) by the Dutch ABN 
Amro and the Spanish Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) for 
‘prudential reasons and formal errors’. This is possible because in the EU the 
control of bank M&A is subject to both competition and prudential control. 
Although the acquisition of BA by ABN Amro was finally approved, the 
intended take-over of the BNL by BBVA failed.  
Following these events, the EU Commission brought actions against Italy for 
infringement of the principle of the free movement of capital. The Commission 
complained that the supervisory review process of the Bank of Italy lacks 
procedural transparency and can create legal uncertainty. This, as was argued, 
could lead to a situation in which the supervisory authority can refuse 
authorization based on opaque concerns, e.g. regarding the ‘stability of 
governance’ (European Commission, 2005a). A survey launched by the EU 
Commission on the barriers to cross-border banking in Europe indicates that 
protectionism in banking markets might not only be an Italian problem. 
According to market participants with previous experience in M&A in the 
banking sector, one of the main barriers to the integration of European banking 
markets is the ‘misuse’ of supervisory powers and political interference 
(European Commission, 2005b). Since the scope for protectionism is expected 
to be smaller if M&A control is more transparent, the EU Commission made a 
proposal in 2006 to change the articles of the banking directive that regulate the 
transfer of ownership in the EU banking sector. 
Although there is anecdotal evidence that the prudential control may constitute a 
barrier to the integration of European retail banking markets, empirical evidence 
is missing until now. The main problem is the lack of data on the scope for 
politicians and supervisors to block M&A in the banking sector. The main 
contribution of this paper is to collect this data and to construct indices on the 
political independence of bank supervisory authorities and the scope for 
supervisors to block the merger with or the acquisition of domestic credit 
institutions. The main source of information to construct these indices is a 
questionnaire on banking regulation that was sent to the supervisory authorities 
in the 25 EU member countries between October 2006 and March 2007. 
2 The Integration of EU Retail-Banking Markets  
Banking markets are integrated if domestic and foreign financial institutions 
face the same set of rules that regulate the financial sector and are treated in a 
non-discriminatory manner when they operate in the market (Baele et al., 2004 
and Hartmann et al., 2003). Regulations that hinder domestic and foreign banks 
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to the same extent therefore do not constitute an obstacle to integration (Baele et 
al., 2004). Only those that discriminate between domestic and foreign banks are 
an integration barrier.2  
The most accurate and direct way to measure the degree of banking market 
integration would therefore be to list all frictions and regulations in the banking 
sector and to check if they apply differently to domestic and foreign credit 
institutions. This is, however, impossible. Banking market integration can hence 
only be measured indirectly by using quantity and price-indicators of 
integration. The latter analyze the development of interest rates of particular 
banking products like deposits or loans in order to measure the degree of 
financial market integration. The idea behind these indicators is that according 
to the law of one price identical products should cost the same price in perfectly 
integrated markets. If this is not the case, and some financial products have a 
higher interest rate in one country than in another, banks will move from the 
low-interest rate country to the high-interest rate country and drive down interest 
rate differentials in the short to medium term. Persistent price differentials for 
the same products across countries should therefore indicate incomplete 
integration of retail-banking markets.3 An alternative price-indicator for banking 
market integration is the convergence of bank return-on-assets (ROA) (Gropp 
and Kashyap, 2007). The idea behind this indicator is that in fully competitive 
markets with a functioning corporate control mechanism bank ROA should 
                                           
2  Integration is here defined according to the preconditions. Other definitions of financial 
integration base on the process or the result of integration. The most common 
definition of financial integration is based on the result of integration. Markets are 
integrated according to this definition if the law of one price holds (Adam et al., 2002 
and Cabral et al., 2002). This law states that identical products should have the same 
price in perfectly integrated markets. It holds if financial institutions arbitrage between 
low-price into high-price countries. This drives down price differentials. Integration 
can therefore also be described as the process of offering financial services in other 
countries either cross-border or by local presence or both. Since financial institutions 
are only able to fully exploit arbitrage opportunities and to offer financial services in 
other countries, if they face the same set of rules and regulations as domestic credit 
institutions do, our definition of financial integration is broader than the two previous 
definitions. 
3  Problematic is that the prices of retail-banking products often consist of different 
components like the loan or deposit rate as well as a fixed service charge (European 
Commission, 2005). Moreover, some products can often only be bought as a package. 
Certain products may therefore be under-priced to attract new clients, while other 
products are often over-priced (European Commission, 2005). The bundling of services 
is according to the retail banking inquiry of the Commission particularly widespread in 
EU retail-banking markets and increases the cost for bank customers (European 
Commission, 2006). Because data on interest rates is often highly aggregated and not 
broken down into its components, prices of retail-banking products are not easily 
comparable across countries (Cabral et al., 2002). It is therefore very difficult to 
establish the law of one price in retail-banking markets. 
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converge over time, since inefficient banks with a low ROA are either be driven 
out of the market or taken over by more efficient credit institutions with a higher 
ROA. 
A comprehensive study on financial integration in Europe has been made by 
Adam et al. (2002). To measure the degree of banking market integration they 
analyze both the development of prices and quantities. Price indicator for the 
level of banking market integration are the degree of convergence of interest 
rates on loans to enterprises. These indicators have also been used by Baele et al. 
(2004). While Adam et al. and Baele et al. measure the degree of integration 
both of banking and capital markets, Cabral et al. (2002) only concentrate on the 
integration of banking markets. To analyze retail-banking market integration, 
they look at the development of household and corporate lending rates. Since 
interest rates are influenced by macro factors (e.g. general interest rate level) as 
well as by micro factors (e.g. market power), Cabral et al. furthermore calculate 
the spread between bank lending and deposit rates in order to disentangle the 
impact of increased competition and integration on the interest rate level. 
Convergence of these margins over time could then be seen as signalling greater 
integration, while a decline in the level can be interpreted as a sign of increased 
competition (Cabral et al., 2002).  
To complement their analysis Adam et al. (2002) and Cabral et al. (2002) also 
use quantity indicators.4 They use the volume of cross-border bank assets to 
measure cross-border activities and the number of branches and subsidiaries to 
measure local activities of foreign banks. Local presence is particularly relevant 
for retail-banking integration, since foreign retail markets will not be easily 
conquerable from distance as long as the use of remote banking (e.g. online 
banking) remains limited (Cabral et. al., 2002). Since the most effective way to 
gain access to local retail-banking markets remains the merger with or the 
acquisition of domestic banks, Cabral et al. (2002) analyze M&A activity in the 
EU banking sector as well. Their main result is that the number of cross-border 
M&A is still limited in the banking sector and that most M&A still take place 
between credit institutions from the same country. European retail-banking 
markets therefore still seem to be fragmented along national lines.  
                                           
4  Quantity indicators are not without problems either. One problem is that a banking 
market is not necessarily isolated if the number or the market share of foreign banks is 
small given that the market is contestable and foreign banks are able to enter the local 
banking market at any time (Gual, 2004). This drives down profit margins of 
incumbent domestic banks although foreign credit institutions are not present in the 
market. Furthermore, it is problematic that a change in ownership may not necessarily 
change the pricing behaviour of financial institutions (Cabral et al., 2002). In this case, 
price differentials persist even though the number and market share of foreign credit 
institutions is high in the country. 
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3 Barriers to Cross-Border Consolidation 
Although there are many benefits related to the international expansion of banks, 
the number of M&A between banks from different countries is still considerably 
lower than the number of domestic M&A (Cabral et al., 2002). This indicates 
that there may be frictions in the M&A process which are greater for foreign 
than for domestic banks. Cross-border consolidation therefore seems to be 
subject to significant obstacles to integration. These obstacles may be 
differentiated into market entry and efficiency barriers.  
Efficiency barriers refer to factors that make it difficult to own and operate a 
bank in a foreign country (Berger et al., 2000). Cultural diversity, different 
languages and corporate cultures are typical efficiency barriers as well as great 
physical distance between the subsidiary and the parent bank. They make the 
post-merger integration process more difficult because different cultures and 
languages make the communication between banks more complicated and delay 
or even prevent an efficient restructuring and reorganisation of the target 
institution. This leads to organizational diseconomies and reduces the potential 
of banks to reap benefits from economies of scale and scope and increased X-
efficiency from cross-border M&A (Berger et al., 2000). Problematic is 
furthermore that consumers might not be indifferent between domestic and 
foreign banks and therefore be reluctant to switch to foreign credit institutions 
(Cabral et al., 2002).  
Besides these natural barriers there are also artificial barriers to integration. 
These barriers are artificial because unlike natural barriers they arose by and can 
be removed through a political process. Differences in the regulation and 
supervision of banks are one example for these kinds of barriers. They limit 
cross-border consolidation because foreign banks have to comply with both 
regulations at home and abroad, while domestic banks only have to comply with 
regulations in their home country. This gives domestic credit institutions cost 
advantages because complying with two different sets of regulations imposes 
additional costs on foreign banks. Efficiency barriers therefore lead to 
considerably lower efficiency gains and might offset most of any potential 
efficiency gains from cross-border bank M&A (Berger et al., 2000).  
Besides these efficiency barriers to integration there are also market entry 
barriers. They make it harder or even impossible for foreign banks to take over 
or merge with domestic credit institutions. Ownership limits for foreign 
investors are one simple example for these kinds of barriers. Another market 
entry barrier that has recently gained particular importance arises when domestic 
and foreign banks are not treated equally during the merger control process. 
Because there are some examples in the EU where supervisory authorities have 
used their powers to discriminate between foreign and domestic banks, the next 
section will take a closer look at these kinds of barriers. 
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4 Merger Regulation in the EU Banking Sector 
4.1 Merger and Competition Control 
M&A control is relevant for the integration of retail-banking because foreign 
banks generally establish subsidiaries by taking over or merging with existing 
domestic credit institutions. The discriminatory application of M&A control 
therefore constitutes not only a barrier to cross-border bank M&A, but also an 
important barrier to the integration of banking markets in the EU. 
The main objective of M&A control is to maintain competition in the market. 
Merger control is therefore part of competition control. In the EU, it is regulated 
in decree No. 4064/1989. This decree defines that the Commission is 
responsible for the control of cross-border M&A if the transaction reaches 
certain turnover thresholds (‘Community Dimension’). The decree furthermore 
defines that all M&A that create or strengthen a dominant position which 
impedes effective competition shall be declared incompatible with the common 
market (Art. 2, p. 2). All M&A between foreign and domestic firms whose 
turnover exceeds the predetermined thresholds and which do not restrict 
competition in the single market should therefore get approval by the EU 
Commission. This is however not the case for M&A that involve banks, because 
Article 21 of decree No. 4064/89 grants member states the right ‘to take 
appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests’ (Article 21, p. 3). 
Legitimate interests are defined as public security, plurality of the media and 
prudential rules (Article 21, p. 3, s. 3). Since prudential rules relate, in particular, 
to financial services (European Commission, 1998), Article 21 grants member 
states the right to block cross-border bank M&A on prudential grounds if 
supervisors are not satisfied with the soundness and prudence of the potential 
investor.  
4.2 Prudential Control of Bank M&A  
Because M&A in the EU banking sector are subject to both competition and 
prudential control, the approval of M&A in the banking sector is conditioned on 
the prudential assessment of the proposed investor. Bank M&A can therefore be 
blocked if regulators deem the potential investor as not suitable to ensure the 
sound and prudent management of the credit institution. This is also regulated 
by the existing EU legal framework. It grants national supervisors the right to 
veto the acquisition of ownership shares in domestic banks, if they are ‘in view 
of the need to ensure sound and prudent management of the credit institution, 
[…] not satisfied as to the suitability [of the potential investor] ‘ (Article 19, p. 
1, s. 2 of Directive 2006/48/EEC).  
Problematic is that the current framework does not provide specific criteria for 
assessing the suitability of the acquirer. The relevant authorities therefore have 
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considerable latitude in accepting, discouraging or rejecting a proposed 
acquisition. This could lead to undue interference by regulators that frustrates 
investors and makes cross-border M&A in the banking sector impractical. This 
has recently been confirmed by an EU Commission survey on the obstacles to 
cross-border consolidation in the EU banking sector. According to market 
participants with previous experience in M&A, the ‘misuse’ of supervisory 
powers and political interference have been identified as one of the main barriers 
that prevent foreign banks from taking over or merging with domestic credit 
institutions (European Commission, 2005b).  
Besides this survey evidence, there were also cases in the past in which 
regulators and politicians more or less successfully tried to block cross-border 
M&A in the banking sector. The first case that became public was the intended 
acquisition of the Portuguese financial group Champlinaud by the Spanish bank 
Banco Santander Central Hispanio (BSCH) in 1999. This acquisition was vetoed 
by the Portuguese Minister of Finance. The grounds for opposing the deal 
included not only ‘late and incomplete notification’ and the ‘absence of a 
transparent structure’ in the new group, but also the ‘necessity to protect the 
national interest” (European Commission, 1999a). This veto was later overruled 
by the European Commission because it was not justified on prudential grounds 
(European Commission, 1999b). A second prominent example was the intended 
takeover of the Italian Banca Antonveneta (BA) by the Dutch ABN Amro. The 
deal was announced in March 2005 and came only one day after the Spanish 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) announced to take over Banca 
Nazionale de Lavoro (BNL), another bank from Italy. Both credit institutions 
already had a strategic stake in the BA and BNL, respectively, before the take-
over announcement. Because both acquisitions were blocked by the President of 
the Bank of Italy for ‘prudential reasons and formal errors’, Banca Popolare di 
Lodi (BPL), and the insurance company Unipol had time to increase their stake 
in both credit institutions. Later both institutions themselves made an 
announcement to take-over the remaining BA and BNL shares. Although the 
acquisition by ABN Amro was yet approved in September 2005, the strategy of 
the President of the Bank of Italy to block the acquisition considerably delayed 
the take-over process and increased legal uncertainty and risk for ABN AMRO. 
The acquisition of the BNL by BBVA however failed after BBVA had 
withdrawn its take-over offer in response to the take-over announcement by 
Unipol.  
These are only three prominent examples where politicians and regulators have 
intervened in the M&A process in order to delay the acquisition of domestic 
banks and to protect them from being taken over by foreign credit institutions. 
They make clear that the supervisory review process has the potential to 
significantly restrict cross-border consolidation and the integration of banking 
markets. 
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4.3 Directive Proposal of the EU Commission 
Initiated by these events and a survey on the obstacles to cross-border banking 
in Europe the EU Commission proposed changes of the relevant article of 
directive 2006/48/EEC in September 2006 (European Commission, 2006a). The 
proposals aim is to considerably improve the legal certainty, clarity and 
transparency of the supervisory review process (European Commission, 2006a). 
The proposal modifies the existing framework with regard to the criteria and the 
procedure used by the supervisory authorities to assess the suitability of the 
proposed investor.  
The directive proposal first sets a closed list of criteria when assessing the 
suitability of potential investors. The criteria proposed are (1) the reputation of 
the investor, (2) the experience of the future management, (3) the financial 
soundness of the proposed acquirer, (4) the ongoing compliance with EU 
directives and (5) no connection to money laundering and terrorism finance 
(European Commission, 2006b).5 To control if supervisors fulfil their 
obligations, they should furthermore provide the Commission with all relevant 
documents on which they have based their assessment. Moreover, the 
Commission has proposed that the reasons that led to the denial of an acquisition 
should be made public. 
To increase legal certainty and transparency of the supervisory review process, 
the new directive should reduce the time period supervisors have to veto an 
acquisition. Under the current directive, regulators have three months to veto the 
takeover of shares by investors (Article 19, p. 1, s. 2). According to the proposal, 
the Commission plans to reduce the assessment period to 30 working days for 
intra-EU M&A (European Commission, 2006b). If the supervisor requests 
additional information to assess the potential investor, this period shall be 
extended once. The extension shall, however, not exceed 10 working days. 
M&A involving banks from third countries shall be assessed within a period of 
maximum 50 working days (European Commission, 2006b). If the competent 
                                           
5  The full wording of the directive proposal for Article 19 of Directive 2006/48/EEC is: 
‘… the competent authorities shall … assess the suitability of the proposed acquirer 
and the financial soundness of the proposed acquisition against all of the following 
criteria: (a) the reputation of the proposed investor; (b) the reputation and experience of 
any person who will direct the business of the credit institution as a result of the 
proposed acquisition; (c) the financial soundness of the proposed acquirer, in particular 
in relation to the type of business pursued and envisaged in the credit institution in 
which the acquisition is sought; (d) whether the credit institution will be able to meet 
and continue to meet the obligations under this directive … and (e) whether there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect that, in connection with the proposed acquisition, money 
laundering or terrorist financing … is being committed or attempted, ort hat the 
proposed acquisition could increase the risk of such conduct’ (European Commission, 
2006b). 
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authorities do not oppose the proposed acquisition or increase in holding within 
this period, the proposed transaction shall be deemed to be approved.6  
5 Measuring Market Entry Barriers 
In the EU, the merger with or the acquisition of credit institutions are unlike 
M&A in the industrial sector subject to both competition and prudential control. 
The prudential assessment of M&A involving banks aims to ensure continued 
compliance with supervisory rules and concentrates among others on the 
suitability of potential shareholders. M&A are therefore blocked by regulators if 
they deem the potential investor as not suitable to ensure the sound and prudent 
management of the involved credit institutions. Because the supervisory review 
process lacks procedural transparency, supervisors and politicians have the 
scope to block cross-border M&A for other than prudential reasons. M&A 
control then constitutes a market entry barrier to integration. 
Although there is anecdotal evidence that M&A control might constitute a 
barrier to the integration of banking markets, empirical evidence is missing until 
now. The main problem is the lack of data on the scope for politicians and 
supervisors to block cross-border M&A in the banking sector. The main 
contribution of this paper is to collect this data and to construct indices on the 
political independence of bank supervisory authorities and the transparency of 
the supervisory review process in the EU. Our paper therefore fits into the 
literature that measures and compares banking regulations around the world.  
The basic paper in this literature is Barth et al. (2001). They set up a large 
database and constructed various indices that cover different aspects of banking 
regulations. Some of these indices also refer to regulations banks face when they 
enter foreign banking markets. Barth et al., however, concentrate on ownership 
                                           
6  The proposal has provoked a dispute between the Commission, the Parliament and the 
national supervisory authorities. To settle this dispute, the Commission has made a 
second proposal (Börsenzeitung, 2007). Since regulators were afraid that the proposed 
assessment period is not long enough to assess complex M&A, the new directive 
proposal provides that the assessment period shall be extended to 60 working days and 
may be prolonged once for additional 20 working days (Börsenzeitung, 2007). M&A 
involving banks from third countries shall be assessed within a maximum number of 90 
working days (Börsenzeitung, 2007). Unclear is still if the decision and the reasons for 
blocking a M&A in the banking sector should be made public. The proposal of the EU 
Commission to get access to all documents on which national supervisors have based 
their assessment also failed (Börsenzeitung, 2007). National supervisors have until now 
only agreed on a list of criteria which should be used for assessing the suitability of 
potential investors (Börsenzeitung, 2007).  
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restrictions and limitations placed on the entry mode of banks only.7 Since such 
restrictions breach the right to establishment and the free flow of capital, they 
are prohibited according to Art. 67 of the EC Treaty. Because all member 
countries comply with the Treaty, restrictions on ownership or the mode of entry 
should not exist in the EU.8 The Barth et al. indices furthermore concentrate on 
direct market entry barriers only. This paper, however, is on indirect barriers.9 
The indices constructed by Barth et al. are hence insufficient to analyze indirect 
market entry barriers to the integration of banking markets.  
A paper that measures the extent of indirect market entry barriers to integration 
is Carletti et al. (2006). They concentrate on the role of supervisors in the M&A 
control process as well. Their focus is, however, different. Carletti et al. 
concentrate on the ability of supervisors to block M&A between banks in order 
to protect incumbent banks from competition and not on the ability of 
supervisors to block M&A in the banking sector due to a lack of procedural 
transparency. Although both studies have parallels, their indices do not measure 
the degree of transparency of the supervisory review process as well and are 
consequently insufficient to find out if banking market integration varies with 
the degree of transparency of the supervisory review process and the strength of 
approval requirements.10   
                                           
7  Barth et al. call these indices Limitations on Foreign Ownership of Domestic Banks 
Index, Limitations and Foreign Bank Entry Index. The first index concentrates on 
limitations on ownership in domestic banks by foreign credit institutions. The Foreign 
Bank Entry Index measures whether there are any restrictions on the ability of foreign 
banks to enter domestic banking markets.  
8  This is also reflected in the answers we received from the supervisory authorities. We 
asked them if there were any restrictions on ownership in the banking between 1990 
and 2005. The full wording of the questions was: ‘Was there a maximum percentage of 
bank capital that could be owned by a single domestic/foreign investor (legal entity or 
natural person) between 1990 and 2005?’ and ‘Was there a maximum percentage of 
bank capital that could collectively be owned by foreign investors (legal entities or 
natural persons) between 1990 and 2005?’  According to the answers from the 
supervisory authorities, no explicit restrictions on ownership were applied either to 
domestic or foreign investors between 1996 and 2005. The full questionnaire is 
presented in Table 1 of the Appendix. 
9  These barriers are not explicitly prohibited by Art. 67 of the Treaty because foreign 
credit institutions are still allowed to participate in domestic banks. But since they 
prevent that foreign firms can take full control over the acquired firm, they deter 
foreigners from taking over shares. The result of these indirect barriers is therefore the 
same as if foreign ownership is prohibited directly. Foreign firms are dissuaded from 
taking over or merging with domestic companies.   
10 Carletti et al. (2006) construct a Supervisory Focus Index. This index measures what 
general criteria national supervisors use in merger control. Three index values are 
possible. The index is attached a value of 1 if only supervisory criteria (e.g. stability) 
and a value of 0.5 if other criteria are used as well. If there is no supervisory control of 
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6 Indices on M&A Control  
To get the data we need to construct our indices, we sent a questionnaire to the 
banking supervisory authorities of the 25 EU member countries from November 
2006 to March 2007. They were asked to provide detailed information on 
ownership limits, reporting and approval requirements for ownership transfers as 
well as the criteria which are used to assess the suitability of a potential investor.  
The first question we asked in our questionnaire was on the transparency of the 
supervisory review process of M&A in the banking sector. We asked the 
national regulators to list official criteria which are used to assess the suitability 
and the qualifications of the proposed investor.11 If the number of criteria is 
large, supervisors have less scope for the interpretation of Article 19 of the EU 
Banking Directive because the supervisory review process is more transparent.  
Supervisors are, however, still able to block cross-border M&A even if the 
criteria to assess the soundness and prudence of a proposed investor are clearly 
defined. This is the case if the reasons to block M&A’s do not have to be 
published. For that reason, we also asked whether the decision and the reasons 
for blocking the transfer of ownership have to be made public.12 The answers to 
these questions have later been used to construct indices on the transparency of 
the supervisory review process. 
The possibility of politicians and supervisors to block cross-border M&A, 
however, not only relies on the transparency of the supervisory review process. 
It also depends on the number of opportunities regulators have to block M&A in 
the banking sector. If regulators can block ownership transfers only once and at 
an initial stage, the chance of supervisors to block M&A because of nationalistic 
                                                                                                                                   
mergers in the banking sector, the index has an index value of 1. This index is almost 
identical to the M&A Criteria Index. Carletti et al., however, do not measure whether 
there are any official criteria that are used by supervisors to assess whether a merger in 
the banking sector endangers the stability of the financial system. They therefore do not 
measure if the supervisory control of mergers is transparent. This is, however, 
important for our study. For this reason, we constructed a Transparency of M&A 
Criteria Index. 
11  The full wording of this question is: ‘Bank supervisory authorities in the EU are 
allowed to block mergers in the banking sector to ensure sound and prudent 
management of credit institutions, if they are not satisfied with the “suitability and 
qualifications of the proposed investor” (Article 19 of 2006/48/EEC). Please note what 
criteria (e.g. financial solidity, reputation of the investor, potential benefits of a merger 
for customers in your country) your institution used between 1990 and 2005 to assess 
the suitability and the qualifications of the proposed investor.’ 
12  The full wording of this question is: ‘Was the institution in your country legally 
required to publish the decision and the reasons, if it is not satisfied with the suitability 
and the qualifications of the proposed investor?’ 
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feelings is smaller than in countries in which regulators have multiple 
opportunities to block the transfer of ownership. This should be covered by the 
questions regarding the approval requirements of ownership transfers in the 
banking sector. To find out how frequently ownership transfers have to be 
approved by the supervisory authority and whether domestic and foreign banks 
are subject to the same approval requirements, we asked whether ownership 
transfers between domestic investors and between domestic and foreign 
investors face different approval requirements.13 Information from the answers 
to these questions has later been used to construct indices on the frequency of 
approval requirements in the banking sector.  
The questionnaire has been filled out by the following ten member countries: the 
Czech Republic, Italy, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Portugal, the Slovak Republic and Sweden. In case that national supervisors had 
not filled out the questionnaire, we extracted the required information from other 
sources.14 We also used these sources of information to cross-check the 
information obtained from the questionnaire if possible. The largest part of this 
information comes from national banking laws. These laws are structured almost 
similarly in every country. They start with a section on who is responsible for 
banking supervision and what business banks are allowed to make. The next 
section is on the establishment and authorization of credit institutions. Rules on 
opening of branches of foreign banks are also laid down in this section. The 
third section mostly deals with the acquisition of ownership in credit institutions. 
It regulates how many percent of capital or voting rights has to be acquired or 
disposed to become subject to approval by the supervisory authority. This 
section also defines by how many percentage points the initial holding in a 
credit institution has to increase/decrease to become subject to approval. This is 
particularly relevant for our indices on the approval requirements for ownership 
transfers in the banking sector. The same section also regulates the conditions 
                                           
13 The full wording of this question is: ‘Did the transfer of ownership between domestic 
investors require approval by the supervisory authority and/or any other institution (e.g. 
government, competition authority, central bank) in your country between 1990 and 
2005?’ and ‘Did the transfer of ownership between domestic and foreign investors 
require approval by the supervisory authority and/or any other institution (e.g. 
government, competition authority, central bank) in your country between 1990 and 
2005?’ 
14  Besides national banking laws, we looked at several reports of the central bank and the 
supervisory authority as well as various Financial Stability Assessment Reports of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since cross-border M&A may not only be blocked 
by national supervisors but also through political interference, we have also constructed 
indices on the political independence of the national regulator. The main source of 
information for these indices is the World Bank Database on Regulation and 
Supervision in the Banking Sector (Barth et al., 2001) and national central bank laws. 
Please see Table 2 for a detailed summary of data sources we used for every country. 
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under which the supervisor is allowed to refuse to grant approval to an 
acquisition or a disposal of controlling shares in a credit institution. This is 
relevant for the indices on the transparency of the supervisory review process.  
Based on the questionnaire and other sources of information we have 
constructed indices on M&A control for the following 20 EU member countries: 
Austria, Finland, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, France, and Italy (hereafter: Western European countries) as well 
as Malta, the Czech and Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, and Poland (hereafter: Central and Eastern European countries). The 
time period for which we have complete information for all countries and for all 
indices is 1996 to 2005.  
6.1 Political Independence 
The first indices we constructed measure the degree of political independence of 
the supervisory authority. If the supervisory authority is independent, politicians 
are less able to put pressure on the supervisory authority to block M&A in the 
banking sector due to nationalistic feelings. 
The first index is called Approval Authority Index (hereafter: Approval Index). It 
is constructed as follows: (1) If the Prime Minister, Minister of Finance or 
Economics or any other member of the cabinet approves the acquisition of 
ownership in a domestic credit institution, the value that is assigned to the index 
will be zero. (2) If the Prime Minister, Minister of Finance or Economics or any 
other member of the cabinet decides in consultation with the supervisory 
authority on the approval of ownership transfers, the index will be assigned a 
value of 0.5. (3) If the supervisory authority or any other authority alone decides 
on approving M&A in the banking sector, the index has a value of 1. A larger 
value therefore indicates greater political independence of the supervisors.  
Figure 1 presents the Approval Index for all countries in 1997, 2001 and 2005. 15 
Approval is given in most countries by the authority which also supervises the 
banking sector. Only in France and Malta, the power to approve has been 
delegated to a special licensing committee. The index value is therefore one for 
all countries. The only exception was Austria between 1996 and 2001 because 
the Minister of Finance directly approved ownership transfers in the banking 
sector during that period. The index value for Austria was consequently assigned 
a value of zero between 1996 and 2001. This changed, however, in 2002 with 
the establishment of the ‘Finanzmarktaufsicht’ as single supervisor for banks 
and capital markets.  
                                           
15  All figures have been put in the Appendix and can be found on pages 25 to 34. 
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Since supervisors might not be independent if they are appointed by the 
government, the second index concentrates on how the head of the authority is 
appointed that approves ownership transfers in the banking sector. The 
Appointment Authority Index (hereafter: Appointment Index) has been 
constructed as follows: (1) If the head of the authority that approves the 
acquisition of ownership transfers in the banking sector is appointed by the 
Prime Minister or any other member of the cabinet, the index will get a value of 
zero. (2) If the head is appointed by the parliament on proposal by the cabinet, 
the index will have a value of 0.5. (3) If the head of the supervisory authority is 
appointed by the parliament without any proposal of or approval by the 
government, the index will be assigned a value of 1. As for the Approval Index, 
a higher value of the Appointment Index indicates less scope for political 
interference.16  
Figure 2 presents the Appointment Index for all countries in 1997, 2001 and 
2005. In almost all countries, the head of the supervisory authority that approves 
ownership transfers in the banking sector is nominated by either the government 
alone or by the parliament on proposal by a member of the government. 
Countries where the head of the supervisory authority is nominated by the 
parliament on proposal by the government are exclusively located in Central and 
Eastern Europe. To combine the information of the Approval and Appointment 
Index, we calculated an aggregate Index of Political Independence. It is defined 
as the sum of the two sub-indices. Based on the aggregate index, the countries 
from Central and Eastern Europe have on average more politically independent 
supervisory authorities than the countries from Western Europe (see Figure 3).   
6.2 Scope for Interpretation 
Since direct barriers on capital flows like ownership restrictions are prohibited 
by EU law, one of the main indirect market entry barriers that hinder foreign 
firms from taking over or merging with domestic banks might be the supervisory 
review process. This might particularly be the case in countries where M&A 
control is intransparent. To measure the transparency of the supervisory process, 
we analyze which criteria regulators officially use when they assess potential 
investors. Criteria are official if they are mentioned in the banking law or any 
other publicly available document. 
The first index measures according to which general criteria (prudence and 
competition) supervisors assess the suitability of potential investors. It is called 
M&A Criteria Index and is constructed as follows: (1) If there are no general 
                                           
16  Most of the information necessary for constructing the indices for the countries in our 
sample comes from the World Bank Database on Regulation and Supervision in the 
Banking Sector (Barth et al., 2001) and national central bank laws. 
 14 
and publicly available criteria to assess M&A the index will get a value of zero. 
(2) If the supervisor decides on approving M&A in the banking sector based on 
competitive and prudential reasons, the index will be assigned a value of 0.5. 
This category has been added because politicians and supervisory authorities 
may block cross-border M&A supposedly for concerns that they may restrict 
competition in the banking sector.17 (3) If the decision to approve M&A is based 
only on the soundness and the prudence of the proposed investor, the index has a 
value of 1. A larger index value therefore indicates less scope for supervisors to 
block cross-border M&A.  
Figure 4 shows the M&A Criteria Index for all countries in 1997, 2001 and 
2005. It indicates that most of the countries assess M&A based on the soundness 
and prudence of the proposed investor only. The median value is one for all 
countries. The high level of convergence is not surprising since the soundness 
and prudence of the investor has been introduced by the EU Banking Directive 
as the only criterion to assess a potential investor. The level of convergence is 
particularly high in Western Europe. Only Sweden and Finland base the decision 
to grant approval to an acquisition in the banking sector on competition issues as 
well. Among the Central and Eastern European countries Estonia, Hungary, and 
Slovenia take account of the effect of M&A on the level of competition in the 
market. Poland and the Slovak Republic, in contrast, did not base the decision to 
approve M&A in the banking sector on any general and publicly available 
criteria between 1997 and 2001 at all. The scope for interference was therefore 
particularly large in these two countries. The variation among Central and 
Eastern European countries is therefore considerably larger than in the group of 
Western European countries.  
As supervisors have more scope to block M&A if the criteria to assess if a 
proposed investor is sound and prudent are not public, we construct a second 
index. This index is called Transparency of M&A Criteria Index. It measures if 
the criteria to assess if potential investors are sound and prudent are documented 
in national banking laws as proposed by the EU Commission. (1) The index gets 
a value of zero if no criteria are documented. If the supervisory authorities 
assess the soundness and prudence based on either the reputation, the financial 
soundness of the proposed investor or the experience/skills of future managers 
and directors and if these criteria are documented in the banking law, the index 
                                           
17  The EU Commission has, for example, brought actions against Poland for infringement 
of the principle of free movement of capital because it inserted a clause in the 
privatization treaty of bank Pekao that did not allow the acquiring bank Unicredit, to 
open subsidiaries and/or branches, acquiring control of banks active in the country and 
making capital investment in any company active in the Polish banking sector for a ten 
year period (EU Commission, 2006). According to the Polish government this clause 
was inserted to ensure ‘the protection of competition in the Polish banking sector’ (EU 
Commission, 2006c). 
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is assigned a value of 0.33. (2) If the supervisor uses two of these criteria to 
assess the soundness and the prudence of a potential investor it gets a value of 
0.67, and (3) if it uses all three criteria, it gets an index value of 1. As in the case 
of the M&A Criteria Index, a larger index value therefore indicates greater 
transparency of the supervisory review process and less scope for interpretation.  
Figure 5 shows the Transparency Index for all countries in 1997, 2001 and 
2005. In contrast to the M&A Criteria Index, the scope for interference is 
considerably larger according to this index. The median value is zero for all 
countries. This is currently also the EU norm. This indicates that most of the 
countries do not use any official criteria to assess the soundness of a proposed 
investor. The recent reform proposal of the EU Commission intends to change 
this. It requires supervisors to base their assessment on official criteria like the 
financial solidity of the proposed investor. If implemented, all countries should 
have an index value of 1. Some countries already use part of the proposed 
criteria. Countries which list official criteria in their banking laws mainly come 
from Central and Eastern Europe. The only countries from this region which do 
not list any explicit criteria are the Czech Republic and Poland. The median 
value for this country group was consequently 0.33 in 2005. This means that 50 
percent of all countries list at least one out of three criteria (financial solidity, 
skills/experience of future management, reputation) in their banking laws. The 
criterion which is currently most often used by supervisors is the financial 
solidity of the proposed investor. Since Portugal is the only country from 
Western Europe that uses an official criterion from our list for the prudential 
assessment of potential investors in the banking sector, the median for this 
country group was zero in 2005 and consequently significantly lower than in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The most legal adjustments are therefore necessary 
in Western Europe once the directive proposal has been implemented.  
However, supervisors are still able to block cross-border M&A on political 
reasons even if the criteria to assess the soundness and prudence of a proposed 
investor are clearly defined. This is the case if the reasons to block an 
acquisition in the banking sector do not have to be published. For that reason, 
we have constructed a third index which captures whether the reasons to block 
M&A in the banking sector have to be made public. It is, for this reason, also 
called Publication of Reasons Index. (1) Because the scope for interpretation is 
larger if the reasons to block a M&A do not have to be publicly disclosed, the 
index is assigned a value of zero if the supervisor does not have the obligation to 
make public the reasons for the disapproval of a merger or an acquisition. (2) If 
the supervisor conversely has to publish the reasons, it gets a value of 1. As is 
the case for the two other indices a larger index value therefore signals a greater 
degree of transparency of the supervisory review process. Since all countries in 
our sample are not legally required according to national banking laws to 
publish the reasons for disapproving the transfer of ownership in the banking 
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sector, the index has a value of zero for all countries and is therefore not 
reported. Because regulators have thus far not agreed on the recent reform 
proposal of the EU Commission to publish the reasons, an improvement seems 
to be unlikely in future.  
To combine the information of the M&A Criteria and Transparency Index, we 
calculated an Aggregate M&A Criteria Index. It is defined as the sum of the two 
sub-indices. Based on the aggregate index, the scope for intervention is on 
average smaller in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe (see 
Figure 6).   
6.3 Scope for Intervention 
The indices so far only cover how transparent the supervisory review process is. 
Since the scope for regulators to block cross-border M&A in the banking sector 
also depends on how often ownership transfers have to be approved, the 
frequency of approval requirements is also relevant.  
The first index is called the Approval Requirements Index. It measures how 
large the initial holding (in banking laws mostly defined as ‘qualified holding’) 
has to be to become subject to approval by national supervisors. The index is 
constructed as follows: (1) If the initial holding in a bank that requires approval 
by the supervisory authority is less than or equal to 5 percent, the index is 
assigned a value of zero. (2) If the initial holding to be approved is equal to or 
larger than 5 percent, but less than and equal to ten percent, the value that is 
attached to the index is 0.5. (3) If it is equal to or larger than 10 percent, the 
index value is 1. This is consistent with the EU norm (Art. 4, p. 11 of Directive 
2006/48/EEC). The member countries are, however, allowed to set lower limits, 
since the 10 percent threshold is only a minimum requirement. Since the scope 
for political interference decreases as the size of the initial holding that does not 
require approval increases, a larger index value indicates less scope for blocking 
cross-border M&A.  
It is however not only important how large the initial holding is that requires 
approval, but also how often the increase of initial holdings has to be approved 
by the supervisory authority. This is captured by the Frequency of Approval 
Requirements Index. The EU norm is that every ownership transfer that exceeds 
20, 33 and 50 percent has to be approved by the supervisory authority (Article 
19, p. 1 of Directive 2006/48/EEC). The member countries are however free to 
set more than three thresholds. The index measures whether the member 
countries have used this option. (1) If there are more than and equal to six 
thresholds the index is assigned a value of 0. (2) The index gets a value of 
0.25/0.5/0.75 if there are 5/4/3 thresholds, respectively. (3) Only if the number 
of thresholds is less than three, the index is attached a value of 1. Since the 
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supervisory authority has less scope to block M&A, if the number of thresholds 
is small, a larger value of the index indicates fewer opportunities for supervisors 
to block ownership transfers. 
Figure 7 presents the Approval Requirements Index for all countries in 1997, 
2001 and 2005. The median for all years is 1. This is also the EU norm. This 
indicates perfect convergence among most EU member countries. Exceptions 
are Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the Slovak Republic which had a threshold value 
for the initial holding of 5 percent in all years. These countries are also the ones 
where the frequency of approval requirements is highest among EU member 
countries. This is measured by the Frequency of Approval Requirements Index 
(see Figure 8). Spain has the lowest index value, because the number of 
thresholds exceeds six (10, 15, 20, 25, 33, 40, 50, 66 and 75 percent). Approval 
requirements are therefore particularly large in Spain. Countries which have low 
index values in 2005 as well are Italy, Portugal, Hungary, Poland, and the 
Slovak Republic. All other countries have exactly implemented EU regulations 
and do not set more than 3 thresholds. The index value for most EU member 
countries is therefore 0.75. This is the median for both country groups in 2005 as 
well.  
To combine the information of the Approval Requirements and Frequency of 
Approval Requirements Index, we calculated an Aggregate Approval 
Requirements Index. It is defined as the sum of the two sub-indices. Based on 
the aggregate index, the strength of approval requirements does not differ 
between country groups (see Figure 9). The median for both groups is 1.75 in 
2005. Countries which are far below the median are Italy and Spain. In these 
countries, approval requirements seem to be particularly strong according to our 
indices.   
6.4 Multivariate Analysis 
The descriptive analysis in the previous section has shown that there is some 
variation among countries and indices. It has however not shown whether there 
are some countries where the supervisory review processes is systematically 
more transparent and approval requirements are low and whether there are other 
countries where the review process is conversely very intransparent and the 
frequency of approval requirements high.  
The first step to detect such systematic patterns among countries is to analyze 
the correlation between the indices. Since the index values are ordinal-scaled, 
Spearman rank-correlation coefficients have been calculated for the period 
between 1997 and 2005. They are presented in Table 3 for all countries and for 
both country groups alone. The most interesting point is the correlation between 
the indices on the transparency of the supervisory review process and the 
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frequency of approval requirements. According to the correlation coefficients 
calculated for all countries, there seems to be no correlation between the 
transparency of the review process and the frequency of approval requirements 
at all. This, however, does not hold when looking at the correlation for both 
country groups separately. In particular, in Western Europe the correlation 
between transparency and reporting requirements is significantly negative. This 
indicates that the threshold value for the initial holding is systematically higher 
if the supervisory review process is transparent and vice versa. Countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe conversely do not seem to follow any systematic 
pattern. Only the correlation coefficient between the Approval Requirements 
Index and the M&A Criteria Index is significant and positive. This means that 
countries in Central and Eastern European which have few approval 
requirements at the same time have a more transparent supervisory review 
process and vice versa.  
A problem of the correlation analysis is that it does not indicate clusters among 
countries. To identify such groups, we performed a hierarchical cluster analysis. 
A cluster analysis is a more advanced method to identify patterns or groups 
among countries than regional grouping. It aims at grouping individuals or 
objects into clusters so that objects in the same cluster are more similar to one 
another than they are to objects in other clusters. The general aim of the cluster 
analysis in this paper is to find out whether there are groups of countries whose 
degree of transparency and strength of approval requirements is systematically 
different from each other.  
Of central importance in attempting to identify clusters of observations is that 
we have to measure how far the EU member countries are apart in terms of 
transparency and strength of approval requirements. Because our indices are 
ordinal-scaled, distance measures for continuous data cannot be used. One 
method therefore is to transform the variables into nominal variables and use 
distance measures for binary data. Countries that have the same index value are 
then coded 1 and zero otherwise. Doing so, however, leads to a loss of 
information because the recoding does not take account of how large differences 
between countries are in terms of transparency and strength of approval 
requirements. We therefore choose to transform the variables in another way. 
The first step of this transformation is to rank the countries according to their 
index value. In order to reduce the number of variables in the cluster analysis, 
we used the aggregate indices on political independence, the transparency of 
M&A criteria, and the frequency of approval requirements.18 The rank numbers 
for these indices have been standardized hereafter to the range [0, 1]. This 
transformation makes it possible to calculate a dissimilarity matrix based on 
                                           
18  The box plots for both indices are presented in Figure 7, 8 and 9 in the Appendix for all 
countries and for both country groups separately. 
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distance measures for interval-scaled data. The distances measure for our indices 
is the squared Euclidian distance: 
( )2Rij ir jr
r 1
d z z
=
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑  
where ijd  is the distance between country i and j, and irz  and jrz are the 
standardized rank values of country i and j, respectively. Based on ijd the 
countries are subsequently linked to each other with the Wards algorithm. This 
algorithm uses an analysis of variance approach to evaluate the distances 
between clusters. Since it minimizes the error sum of squares, the Wards linkage 
leads to very homogeneous clusters. The results of the cluster analysis are 
finally plotted with the help of a dendrogram. Countries with similar degree of 
transparency and strength of approval requirements should be joined to clusters 
at an early stage of the clustering procedure.  
Figure 10 presents the dendogram for the Index of Political Independence, the 
Aggregate M&A Criteria Index and the Aggregate Approval Requirements Index 
in 2005. Three different clusters have been identified by the Wards algorithm. 
The first cluster is formed by the three Baltic countries Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania as well as Slovenia. To the second cluster belong Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, and the Slovak Republic. The third cluster contains most of the 
countries in our sample. It consists of Austria, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, 
Malta, and the Netherlands. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland also 
belong to this cluster. Finland and Sweden join the cluster like Poland and 
Hungary at a later stage. Figure 11 makes clear why the countries have been 
joined by the cluster algorithm to form these groups of countries. This figure 
shows the mean values for the three aggregate indices of the respective cluster in 
2005 in a three-dimensional diagram. According to Figure 11, all countries with 
multiple approval requirements belong to the second country cluster. These 
countries have at the same time a high degree of political independence of the 
supervisory authority and a relatively transparent supervisory review process. 
The latter holds for the countries in the first cluster as well. These countries have 
in contrast to the second cluster, however, at the same time only few approval 
requirements. The possibility for politicians and supervisors to block cross-
border M&A due to nationalistic feelings should therefore according to our 
indices be particularly small in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as well as in 
Slovenia. All countries which have a relatively intransparent review process but 
only few approval requirements have been joined by the cluster algorithm in the 
third cluster. The most Western European countries belong to this group.  
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7 Conclusions 
Although there is anecdotal evidence that the control of M&A in the EU 
banking sector may constitute a market entry barrier to the integration of 
European banking markets, empirical evidence is missing until now. The main 
problem is the lack of data on the scope for politicians and supervisors to block 
cross-border M&A in the banking sector. The main contribution of this paper 
therefore was to collect this data and to construct indices on the political 
independence of bank supervisory authorities and the transparency of the 
supervisory review process in the EU.  
The descriptive analysis has shown that the degree of transparency and the 
strength of approval requirements for ownership transfers is different in the EU 
although the harmonization of banking regulations has already led to some level 
of convergence. Since the scope for supervisors and politicians to block cross-
border M&A during M&A control depends on the transparency of the 
supervisory review process and the strength of approval requirements, countries 
with transparent M&A control and low approval requirements are expected to 
have lower market entry barriers than countries where M&A control is 
intransparent and approval requirements are high. Since the countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe are on average more transparent and have less 
approval requirements than the countries from Western Europe market entry 
barriers that arise from merger control are according to our indices smaller in the 
new EU member countries. If this has facilitated the entry of foreign banks in 
Central and Eastern Europe and conversely dissuaded foreign credit-institutions 
from merging with or taking over banks from Western Europe, however, 
remains an empirical question.  
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Appendix 
Country Codes:  
AT - Austria 
CZ – Czech Republic 
DE – Germany  
EE – Estonia  
ES – Spain  
FI – Finland  
F – France  
GR – Greece  
HU – Hungary  
IT – Italy  
LI - Lithuania 
LU – Luxemburg  
LV - Latvia 
MA – Malta  
NL – Netherlands  
PL – Poland  
PT – Portugal  
SK – Slovak Republic   
SL – Slovenia  
SW – Sweden  
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Figure 2: Appointment Authority Index 
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Figure 3: Index of Political Independence  
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Figure 4: M&A Criteria Index  
1997 
0
0,5
1
EE CZ HU LI LV MA PL SK SL AT DE ES FI FR GR IT LU NL PT SW
In
de
x 
V
al
ue
 
2001 
0
0,5
1
EE CZ HU LI LV MA PL SK SL AT DE ES FI FR GR IT LU NL PT SW
In
de
x 
V
al
ue
 
2005 
0
0,5
1
EE CZ HU LI LV MA PL SK SL AT DE ES FI FR GR IT LU NL PT SW
In
de
x 
V
al
ue
 
 
 27 
Figure 5: Transparency of M&A Criteria Index 
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Figure 6: Aggregate M&A Criteria Index  
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Figure 7: Approval Requirements Index  
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Figure 8: Frequency of Approval Requirements Index  
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Figure 9: Aggregate Approval Requirements Index 
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Figure 10: Dendogram 
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Figure 11: Cluster Mean Analysis 
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Table 1: The Questionnaire 
 
1. Restrictions on Ownership 
a) Was there a maximum percentage of bank capital that could be owned by a single domestic investor (legal entity 
or natural person) between 1990 and 2005? 
 
Yes   No    
 
If yes, please fill out: 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Ownership 
limit (in % 
of total 
capital)                                 
 
b) Was there a maximum percentage of bank capital that could be owned by a single foreign investor (legal entity or 
natural person) between 1990 and 2005? 
Yes   No    
 
If yes, please fill out: 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Ownership 
limit (in % 
of total 
capital)                                 
 
c) Was there a maximum percentage of bank capital that could collectively be owned by foreign investors (legal 
entities or natural persons) between 1990 and 2005?   
 
Yes   No    
 
If yes, please fill out: 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Ownership 
limit (in % 
of total 
capital)                                 
 
2. Approval and Reporting Requirements 
 
a) Did the transfer of bank ownership between domestic investors have to be reported to the supervisory authority 
and/or any other institution (e.g. government, competition authority, central bank) in your country between 1990 and 
2005? 
 
Yes   No   
 
If yes, please explain what percent of bank capital had to be transferred between domestic investors to be subject to 
reporting to an institution in your country between 1990 and 2005: 
 
 
 Percent of Bank Capital:                 Name of the Institution to be informed:                     Time Period: 
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b) Did the transfer of bank ownership between domestic and foreign investors have to be reported to the supervisory 
authority and/or any other institution (e.g. government, competition authority, central bank) in your country between 
1990 and 2005? 
 
Yes   No   
      
If yes, please explain what percent of bank capital had to be transferred between domestic and foreign investors to be 
subject to reporting to an institution in your country: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c) Did the transfer of bank ownership between domestic investors require approval by the supervisory authority 
and/or any other institution (e.g. government, competition authority, central bank) in your country between 1990 and 
2005?  
 
Yes   No   
      
If yes, please explain what percent of bank capital had to be transferred between domestic investors to be subject to 
approval by any institution in your country: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d) Did the transfer of bank ownership between domestic and foreign investors require approval by the supervisory 
authority and/or any other institution (e.g. government, competition authority, central bank) in your country between 
1990 and 2005? 
 
Yes   No  
      
If yes, please explain what percent of bank capital had to be transferred between domestic and foreign investors to be 
subject to approval by any institution in your country: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Transparency of the Supervisory Review Process 
 
a) Bank supervisory authorities in the EU are allowed to block mergers in the banking sector to ensure sound and 
prudent management of credit institutions, if they are not satisfied with the “suitability and qualifications of the 
proposed investor” (Article 19 of the EU Banking Directive). Please note what criteria (e.g. financial solidity, 
reputation of the investor, potential benefits of a merger for customers in your country) your institution used between 
1990 and 2005 to assess the suitability and the qualifications of the proposed investor: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Was the institution in your country legally required to publish the decision and the reasons, if it is not satisfied 
with the suitability and the qualifications of the proposed investor? 
Yes   No  
 
Percent of Bank Capital:                 Name of the Institution to be informed:                   Time Period: 
Percent of Bank Capital:               Name of the Institution that gives Approval:                   Time Period: 
Percent of Bank Capital:               Name of the Institution that gives Approval:                   Time Period: 
Criteria to assess the suitability of the proposed investor:                                           Time Period: 
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If yes, please specify (X) in which years the supervisory authority in your country was legally required to publish the 
decision and the reasons for blocking a proposed merger in the banking sector in your country: 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Publication 
of the 
decision 
and the 
reasons                                 
 
Table 2: Data Sources 
Country Source Date
     
AT Bundesgesetz über das Bankwesen (BWG) 1993
     
CZ Questionnaire 2007
CZ Czech Republic, Act of the Czech Republic No. 21/1992 Sb. on banks 1992
CZ New York University School of Law, Conditions for the Establishment of New Banks in the Czech Republic 1994
CZ New York University School of Law, The Act of July 8, 1994 passed by the Czech Parliament 1994
CZ Matoušek, R.: The Czech Banking System in the Light of Regulation and Supervision, Selected Issues WP, No. 5. 2005
     
DE Questionnaire 2007
DE Federal Republic of Germany, Kreditwesengesetz 1988
     
EE IMF, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) Estonia 2000
EE Republic of Estonia, Eesti Pank, Law on Credit Institutions  1994
EE Eesti Pank, Credit Institutions Act 1999
EE Republic of Estonia,  Credit Institutions Act 2005
     
ES Republic of Spain, Law 26/1988: Discipline and Intervention of Credit Institutions 1988
ES Bank of Spain, Law 13/1994: Law of Autonomy of the Banco de España 1994
ES Republic of Spain, Royal Decree 1245/1995 1995
ES IMF, Country Report No. 06/218: Financial Sector Assessment Program 2006
     
FI Republic of Finland, Act on the Operation of a Foreign Credit Institution or Financial Institution in Finland 2001
FI Republic of Finland, Act on Credit Institutions 2005
     
FR Banque de France, Comité des Établissements de Crédit et des Entreprises d'Investissement, Annual Report 2005
FR Banque de France, Comité de la Réglementation Bancaire et financière, French Banking Act 24 January 1984 1984
FR Republic of France, Regulation 96-16 of December 1996 2001
FR Republic of France,Regulation 92-13 of 23 December 1992 2005
FR IMF, Country Report No. 05/186 2005
FR Republic of France, Regulation 92-14 of December 1992 2006
     
GR Questionnaire 2007
GR The Impact of the Banking Directives on the Greek Banking System 2004
     
HU Act CXII of 1996 on Credit Institutions and Financial Entreprises 1997
HU Act CXII of 1996 on Credit Institutions and Financial Entreprises 2006
HU Barsi, T., Overview on Banking Regulations. International Law Office Internet Publication 2000
HU Budai, J. und  H. Bozsonyik, Preperation for Single Market Supervision Tasks 2001
HU IMF, Country Report No. 05/348 2005
HU Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority: Authorization guidelines (Money Market). 2006
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IT Questionnaire 2007
IT Banca of Italy, The 1993 Banking Law 1993
IT Republic of Italy, The 1993 Banking Law 2000
IT IMF Country Report No. 04/133 2004
IT IMF, Financial System Stability Assessment 2006
     
LI Questionnaire 2007
LI New York University School of Law, Law on Commercial (Joint Stock) Banks 1992
LI Bank of Lithuania, Operations of Credit Institutions in 2000 2000
LI Bank of Lithuania, The Law on the Bank of Lithuania 1994
LI Republic of Lithuania, Law on Commercial Banks 1994
LI Republic of Lithuania, Law on Banks 2004
LI Republic of Lithuania, Law on Commercial (Joint Stock) Banks 2005
LI Operations of Credit Institutions in 2004 2005
LI Republic of Lithuania, Law on Financial Institutions 2005
     
LU Questionnaire 2007
     
LV Questionnaire 2007
LV Bank of Latvia, Regulations on granting licenses to perform banking transactions 1993
LV Republic of Latvia, Law of National Republic of Latvia 1998
LV Bank of Latvia, Credit Institutions Supervision Department, Annual Report 1999 2000
LV Bank of Latvia, Operations of Credit Institutions in 2000 2000
     
MA Questionnaire 2007
MA Banking Act, Act XV of 1994 1994
     
NL Credit System Supervision Manual, Act on the Supervision of the Credit System 1992 2005
NL De Nederlandsche Bank, Bank Act 1998 2000
     
PL New York University School of Law, The Banking Law of January 31, 1989 1992
PL New York University School of Law, Act of December 19, 1992 1993
PL Republic of Poland, The Banking Act of August 29, 1997 1998
PL National Bank of Poland, The Polish Banking System in the Nineties  2001
     
PT Questionnaire 2007
PT IMF, Financial Sector Assessment Program  2006
     
SK Questionnaire 2007
SK National Bank of Slovakia, European Banking Directives and Their Implementation in the Slovak Republic 2000
SK Republic of Slovakia, Act on Banks 2001
     
SL Republic of Slovenia, Law on Banks and Savings Banks 1991
SL Republic of Slovenia, Banking Act 1999
SL Republic of Slovenia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, Banking Act 1999
SL Republic of Slovenia, Act on the Amandements and Additions to the Banking Act 2001
SL Bank of Slovenia, Annual Overview 2004
SL Bank of Slovenia, Law on the Bank of Slovenia 1991
SL Bank of Slovenia, Bank of Slovenia Act 2002
SL Bank of Slovenia, Regulation on the Harmonisation of the Amounts of the minimum inital capital of a bank and a savings bank 2004
SL Republic of Slovenia, Act on the Amandements and Additions to the Banking Act 2  2004
SL New York University School of Law, Law on Banks and Savings Banks 2007
     
SW Questionnaire 2007
SW Republic of Sweden, The Banking Business Act (SFS 1987:617) 1987
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Table 3: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients 
- All Countries - 
 
 
*indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
 
 
- Western Europe – 
 
*indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
 
 Approval Authority Index 
Appointment 
Authority Index 
M&A Criteria 
Index 
Transparency of 
M&A Criteria 
Index 
Approval 
Requirements 
Index 
Frequency of 
Approval 
Requirements 
Index 
Approval Authority 
Index 1.00       
Appointment 
Authority Index 0.11 1.00      
M&A Criteria Index 0.03 -0.24* 1.00     
Transparency of 
M&A Criteria Index 0.13* 0.69* -0.15* 1.00    
Approval 
Requirements Index -0.10 0.09 -0.12 -0.03 1.00   
Frequency of 
Approval 
Requirements Index 
0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.09 0.58* 1.00 
 Approval Authority Index 
Appointment 
Authority Index 
M&A Criteria 
Index 
Transparency of 
M&A Criteria 
Index 
Approval 
Requirements 
Index 
Frequency of 
Approval 
Requirements 
Index 
Approval Authority 
Index 1.00       
Appointment 
Authority Index -       
M&A Criteria Index -0.11 - 1.00     
Transparency of 
M&A Criteria Index 0.07 - 0.15 1.00    
Approval 
Requirements Index -0.14 - -0.29* -0.52* 1.00   
Frequency of 
Approval 
Requirements Index 
-0.06 - -0.13 -0.08 0.77* 1.00 
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Central and Eastern Europe - 
 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
 Approval Authority Index 
Appointment 
Authority Index 
M&A Criteria 
Index 
Transparency of 
M&A Criteria 
Index 
Approval 
Requirements 
Index 
Frequency of 
Approval 
Requirements 
Index 
Approval Authority 
Index 1.00      
Appointment 
Authority Index 0.16 1.00     
M&A Criteria Index 0.28 -0.07 1.00    
Transparency of 
M&A Criteria Index 0.17 0.65* 0.09 1.00   
Approval 
Requirements Index -0.06 -0.05 0.22* -0.03 1.00  
Frequency of 
Approval 
Requirements Index 
0.29 0.29* 0.12 0.12 0.42* 1.00 
